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" . . .  A still further step would be to show that the basic principles 
of language are formulated in terms of notions drawn from the 
domain of (virtual) conceptual necessity" (p.6) 
1 1 7 
N. Chomsky , 1992 
We consider a condition F, which relates the syntactic structuresl of a natural 
language and their interpretation in arry other system, in particular in ones, 
considered here, we may plausibly call semantic or "conceptual-intentional" .  
F is general : it is neither language nor structure specific, nor even rule, 
structure, or representation type specific. Symbolic systems L which satisfy F are 
ones which are, in a sense made precise in 3 ,faith/ul to the syntactic structure of 
L. Accordingly we shall refer to F as a Fidelity Principle. Mnemonically: 
( 1 )  F 
Semantic interpretation is faithful to syntax2 
I claim that F as defined in 3 expresses a very general truth about natural 
language. In the terms of CH-92 , F is the interpretative analogue of a largely 
language invariant "computational procedure" which derives the syntactic 
structuresl of a language L from the partially L-specific lexical items and 
morphology. By contrast , symbolic systems that fail F lack a regular relation 
between form and interpretation . Such "systems" seem to me conceptually ill 
suited to the representation of information, and would be decidedly unlanguage­
like. Thus I offer F as a Jinguistic candidate for a "(virtual) conceptual necessity" 
(without suggesting that F was intended in Chomksy 1992 (CH-92» . 
To support F and to explicate the notions in terms of which it is formulated, 
we argue that it derives (2). 
(2) Anapbor-Antecedent Asymmetry (AAA) 
In minimal instances of the Anaphor-Antecedent relation we 
cannot interchange an anaphor and its antecedent preserving 
both syntactic form and logical meaning 
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1. Anapbor-Antecedent Asymmetry (AAA) . 
A -expressions are ones that must be interpreted as referentially dependent in a 
certain way (see 2). Lexical A-expressions will sometimes be called anaphors. 
Some examples of A-expressions are italicized in (3) . 
(3) a. Some student's teacher blamed himself for the accident. 
b. One of the students criticized everyone but himself 
c. No student criticized both himself and his teacher 
Since A-expressions are semantically defined, the following query makes sense: 
Query 1 (Ql) Given a grammar G for a language L, 
a. Is the set of A-expressions of L syntactically identifiable in tenns ofG ? 
b. If not, is it lexically identifiable ( = computable given G and the set 
lexical A-expressions.)? 
To vary terminology in contexts like Qla we may replace syntactically with 
structurally and identifiable with definable or characterizable. A fully general 
definition of this notion is given in 2.2.  We also provide a semantic defmition of 
A-expression and exhibit a formal language Little English in which the set of A­
expressions is not syntactically definable in terms of the grammar we provide. 
But that set is lexically identifiable. The example shows that: 
i .  Semantically defined sets may fail to be syntactically definable. So Qla 
is not circular or trivial . Natural languages could fail it; and 
ii . The ability to structurally identify A-expressions is not a conceptual 
necessity. The simplicity and naturaleness of the example support this. 
Much empirical wor12 (esp. the " skeptical" Keenan 1987, 1988) leads me to 
think that natural languages do structurally identify their A-expressions. So I 
think that Qla, and a fortiori Qlb, are to be answered affirmatively (though in 
the absence of adequate grammars no firm conclusion can be drawn) . But a full 
yea to Ql does not disturb the truth of (ii). (li) only claims that the structural 
identifiability of A-expressions is not conceptually necessary. 
By contrast, I claim that the set of logically true sentences of (real) English is 
not syntactically definable in terms of any adequate grammar for English. (We 
think of a sentence as being logically true iff it is true no matter what the world 
is like) . Here is one argument (among infinitely many) that supports this claim 
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(and helps us understand it better) : (4a,b) should be syntactically isomorphic ( = 
have the same syntactic structure) on any adequate grammar of English. 
(4) a. Either fewer than thirty or else more than ninety linguists were martyred 
b. Either fewer than ninety or else more than thirty linguists were martyred 
I know of no grammaticality based property which distinguishes (4a) from (4b). 
Such a property would have to distinguish thirty from ninery. So these Ss appear 
to be syntactically identical; they are built in the same way, differing only trivially 
with regard to lexical choice. But (4b) is logically true: every number, in 
particular the number of linguists who were martyred, is either less than 90 or 
greater than 30. But (4a) is not logically true. It is false in any situation in which 
the number of linguists martyred is exactly 37. 
Thus just knowing the syntactic form of an English sentence is not sufficient 
to decide whether it is logically true or not. Ss like (4a,b) have the same form 
but differ wrt their logical truth This can happen because part of what determines 
the truth of a sentence is the meanings of its lexical items and we can often find 
semantically distinct lexical items which cannot be syntactically distinguished. 
Indeed, the notion grammatical category serves, in part, to class together 
expressions which can be discriminated semantically but not syntactically. 
In Little English, himself is an A-expression but him is not. But the syntax of 
this language does not distinguish between him and himself - a derivation 
beginning with one can always have it replaced by the other preserving well 
formedness (but not of course interpretation) . So in this L we find syntactically 
isomorphic expressions (e.g.  himself and him; both himselfandjohn and both him 
and john, . . . ) which differ with regard to being A-expressions. That is, the set 
of A-expressions is not syntactically identifiable in Little English. 
Real English seems to differ from our artificial example in this regard. himself 
can not always replace him initially in a derivation preserving grammaticality: 
Both John and Bill criticized him is grammatical but Both John and Bill criticized 
himself is not. I suspect that the only expression himself is isomorphic to in 
English is himself itself (but we need an adequate grammar to support this!). We 
shall later characterize "grammatical words" as those expressions that are 
isomorphic only to themselves. 
It seems then that the property of being interpreted anaphorically is "coded" in 
the syntax of English in a way in which the property of being logically true is not, 
a result in accordance with the " naive" intuitions of generative grammarians. 
1 20 
Secondly, as per work in Binding Theory) we understand that the anaphor 
himself in (5) stands in the is anteceded by (= AA) relation to each student's 
advisor. It cannot stand in that relation to each student or to Mone in (5). 
(5) Noone, thought that each student's  advisor disqualified himself 
Query 2 (Q2) 
a. Does every natural language L have a grammar G in terms of which the 
AA relation in L is syntactically definable? 
b. If yes, then does there exist a uniform definition -- one that applies in the 
same way in all Ls? 
Q2a says that given an occurrence of an A-expression ex. in an expression cr we 
should be able to specify in terms of the grammar G just which (occurrences of) 
expressions in 0' are possible antecedents for a.. Q2b says that this computation 
is executed in the same way in all Ls. 
Much work in generative grammar is consistent with an affirmative answer to 
Q2a. Keenan (1 987, 1988, 199 1 )  plus a few remarks below suggest that Q2b 
should be answered negatively. But we do not pursue this question here. 
Rather, we investigate the notion of asymmetry in AAA. Our intuition is that 
languages are not indifferent as to the relative presentation of A-expressions and 
their antecedents. They care which is which. But how to say this rigorously? 
We begin with an example. An adequate grammar of English will enable us 
to say that (6a,b) have the same syntactic structure (though different grammars 
may differ as to just what that structure is): 
(6) a. John criticized Bill b. Bill criticized John 
(6a,b) differ just by choice of lexical item - once those choices are given the 
derivation and interpretation of the two Ss proceeds identically. So showing that 
(6a,b) have the same structure will involve matching up the steps in their 
derivations, beginning with the matching of the lexical items: John with Bill, 
criticized with criticized, and Bill with John. The matched expressions are images 
of each other under the structure preserving maps (isomorphisms) which say that 
(6a,b) have the same structure (= are isomorphic). Now consider: 
(7) a. John criticized himself b .  Himself criticized John 
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Could we have a language like English except that in addition to Ss like (7a), 
we systematically find logical paraphrases like (7b) which are not only 
grammatical but are syntactically isomorphic to (7a) , just as (6b) is to (6a)? 
The AAA says no. But is this claim is consistent with linguistic reality? 
As regards Modern American English, Ss like (7b) are simply ungrammatical 
and so will satisfy AAA in virtue of exhibiting some sort of structural difference 
from (7a) . In some varieties of English however, notably Irish English4, (7b) is 
perfectly grammatical. But it still satisfies AAA since it does not exhibit the 
binding relations of (7a) and so is not a logical paraphrase of it. Rather the 
subject himself in (7b) is deictically interpreted as something like "the most 
prominent male" in the context of utterance. (And in Wait a minute, herself is 
getting herself ready (J. McCloskey (PC); See Keenan 1988) the first occurrence 
of herself is deictica1ly interpreted as the prominent female in context) . 
Thus our intuition of asymmetry could not have been captured simply by 
"cannot be interchanged preserving grammaticality".  
Tougher nuts concern the freedom of anaphor-antecedent order ("  scrambling")s 
in Ls like Bengali, Hindi, and Korean. Arguments of transitive verbs in these 
head-final Ls are distinguished by overt case marking, their relative order 
preverbally being rather free, even when one is an anaphor whose antecedent is 
properly quantified (9) or interrogative ( 10). (Nominative marking is -lea 
following a vowel, -i following a consonant) . 
(8) a. John-i caki-casin-ul pinanhayssta 
John-nom self- -ace criticized 
John criticized himself. 
b. caki-casin-ul John-i pinanhayssta 
self- -ace John-nom criticized 
John criticized himself 
(9) a. Nwukwunka( -ka) caki-casin-ul pinanhayssta 
someone(-nom) self- -ace criticized 
Someone criticized himself 
b. Caki-casin-ul nwukwunka(-ka) pinanhayssta 
self- -ace someone(-nom) criticized 
Someone criticized himself 
KOREAN 
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(10) a. Nwuka caki-casin-ul pinanhayss-ni 
Who self� -acc criticized-Q 
Who criticized himself? 
b. Caki-casin-ul nwuka pinanhayss-ni 
self- -acc who criticized-Q 
Who criticized himself? 
So in Korean , A-expressions like caki-casin-ul may be interchanged with their 
antecedents preserving both grammaticality and logical meaning. 
The AAA claims that the (a,b) pairs in (8) - (10) are not syntactically 
isomorphic. While in agreement with the (limited) generative literature on 
"scrambling" ,  this claim is not at all obvious. 
The tough counter claim to the AAA here is that the identity map id is an 
isomorphism relating each (a,b) pair in (8) - ( 10) . That map does not preserve 
linear order: John-i precedes caki-casin-ul in (8a) but id(John-z) = John-i does 
not precede id(caki-casin-ul) == caki-casin-ul in (8b). But, the empirical argument 
would go, the relative order of arguments here is not part of Korean structure. 
Case marking codes grammatical function so fixing order is of no value (and so 
by economy isn ' t  used). But NPs are dumb in morphologically impoverished 
languages (English) so the logically more complicated extrinsic ordering is 
invoked as a default. 
There is, I think, serious prima facie support for this position. Most crucially, 
preserving case markers is an important (though perhaps not the only) determinant 
of syntactic sameness. This is seen by the fact that merely interchanging the NPs 
in (8) without moving their case markers results in serious ungrammaticality. 
(1 1)  a. * Caki.-casin-i John-ul pinanhayssta 
self- -nom John-ace criticized 
He-self criticized John 
b. * John-ul caki-casin-i pinanhayssta 
John-acc self- -nom criticized 
John criticized he-self 
We are concerned here to show that it is conceptually possible to have a 
language which behaves as Korean appears to and which satisfies the AAA. 
Whether real Korean satisfies the AAA is a serious empirical question (see e.g. 
Lee, 1 993) beyond the purview of this article6• Accordingly we exhibit in 2.5 a 
Little Korean in which the AAA is satisfied , case marking is non-trivially 
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structural (not just a "coding" for hierarchical structure) � and the C-command 
relation between an A -expression and its antecedent can vary freely preserving 
semantic interpretation. So the syntactic and associated semantic differences 
between Little English and Little Korean are detennined by overt morphological 
differences between these languages. 
We will see that an important conceptual plus for our notion of structure is that 
morpheme identity, category identity, and syntactic hierarchy (e.g. dominates) fall 
out as special cases of structure -- none being derivative from the other. Thus our 
notion of structure properly generalizes the standard one. 
2. Little Languages: Generalized Structure 
2.1 Little English We exhibit a grammar, ENG, whose language L(ENG) = 
Little English is used to illustrate the notion syruactically definable in G. 
ENG has some lexical nominative NPs (NPnom ' s) : john and he; some lexical 
accusative NPs, NPacc' s: john, him. and himself; some lexical two place 
predicates, P2's: praised and criticized; and some lexical one place predicates, 
PIs: laughed and cried. Rules combine P2s with NPacc's  to form Pls, and Pls 
with NPnom's to form Ss. For each of these categories C, expressions of 
category C may combine in the appropriate way with both . . . and . . . , either . . .  or . . . , 
and neither . . .  nor . . . . to form a complex expression of the same category. L(ENG) 
has a simple context free grammar: 
S -- > NPnom + PI;  P I  -- > P2 + NPacc 
C -- > both C and C, either C or C, neither C nor C, 
all C E {NPnom, NPacc, P2, PI,  S} 
NPnom -- >  john, bill, tom, bob, he 
NPacc --- > john, bill ,  tom, bob, him, himself 
PI -- > laughed cried 
P2 --- > praised, criticized 
We present ENG in our Generalized Grammar format: First, we must defme 
the vocabularly V = {john, . . .  ,cried, . . . .  both, . . .  } used. Then we define CAT, 
the set of categories used: {NPnom, NPacc, S, Pl , P2, CONI} . (We have added 
CONJ = Conjunction in order to illustrate a slight generalization) . Third, we 
define the set LEX of lexical expressions. 
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In general an expression is treated as a pair (s,C) , where C is a category 
symbol and s is a string built from elements of V. V· is the set of finite strings 
of elements of V, and V· xCA T is the set of possible expressions. In ENG 
(;ohn,NPnom) is an element of LEX. So is (john,NParx:.). LEX is defined (in 
this case, not necessarily) by listing. 
Notation: If 0 - (s,C) is an expression we write Cat(o) or O2 for the category 
of 0 ,  and we write String(O") or 0"1 for its string part. E.g. Cat(praised bill,P2) 
= P2 , String(praised bill,P2) = praised bill. 
Finally, we represent the ways of combining expressions to build more complex 
ones by (partial) functions, called the generating or structure building functions 
of G. The single most important determinant of "structure" lies in specifying the 
domains (" structural descriptions ") of these functions. 
For example, given V and CAT as above for ENG, we define a function F2 
which builds PIs  from P2s and NPacc 's  as follows. The domain of F2 ,  Dom(F2) , 
is the set of pairs < 0". t > of possible expressions which meet the condition that 
Cat(t) = P2 and Cat(O") = NPacc. The action of F2 is given by: 
F2(o,t) = < t1 + O"J, PI > 
where we use ' + I for concatenation (with or without a "space" as is convenient) . 
Thus F2 takes a possible expression t of category P2 and a possible expression 
0" of category NPacc and yields a possible expression of category PI whose string 
part is the string part of t followed by the string part of 0". 
Similarly FI is defined to build expressions of category S from pairs of 
category NPnom and P I respectively. 
We illustrate the coordination rules with AND. It takes as arguments triples 
< p,O',t > of possible expressions, where p is simply < and,CONJ >  and Cat(a) 
= Cat(t) is in {NPnom , NPacc, S ,  PI , P2} , the set of coordinable categories. 
The value of AND at such a triple is given by 
Thus AND coordinates the string parts of 0' and t in the obvious way, and the 
category of the resultant expression is the same as that of its conjuncts. The 
functions OR and NOR are defined comparably. 
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Finally, we define L(ENG), the language generated by the grammar ENG , to 
be the closure of LEX under the generating functions7• That is, L(ENG) is the 
set of expressions obtainable from LEX by applying the generating functions 
finitely many times in any way in which their structural descriptions are satisfied. 
In sum:  a (generalized) grammar G is a four-tuple < V,CAT;LEX,F> with 
LEX � V'·xCA T, F a set of partial functions each taking sequences of possible 
expressions to possible expressions, and L(G) the closure of LEX wrt F. And, 
Full Expressive Power 
Any collection of sets is definable by a generalized grammar 
FEP guarantees that our format of presentation imposes no constraints whatever 
on the class of languages that can be · represented. In particular common X' 
systems are easily coded in this format (see Stabler & Keenan. 1993). (So any 
constraints which distinguish natural languages from other structures must be 
explicitly given. Nothing follows from the format of presentation itself) . 
2.2 Generalized Structure 
We make precise the idea that two expressions have the same structure if we 
can match their lexical items and derivation steps in an appropriate way. 
deC 1 A function h from L(G) -+ L(G) preserves structure iff for all SJ:u:tre 
building functions F, (i) and (ii) below hold: 
i. h preserves DomF 
( = if a tuple 0" of elements of L(G) is in DomF then h(O") is also in DomF) 
ii. h commutes with F 
( = F maps 0" to -c implies F maps h(O") to h(-c) . 
(i) says that if a structure building function F can recognize (structurally 
analyze) a sequence 0" of expressions then it can also recognize h(O") . So h 
preserves the property of being analyzable by a structure building function. 
(ii) says that a structure building function F treats an argument 0" and its 
image under h " the same" : the structure that F builds from h(O") differs from that 




0- �.-- ----- -- > 't 
h I I h 
h(o-) l-------- -- --- > h('t) 
F 
"Commutes" means that if we apply F to cr and then h to the result, we get the 
same object as if we had applied h to cr first and then F to the result. We shall 
often use such diagrams to express the intuitive notion "preserves structure" .  
notation & terminology A function h which preserves structure as above is 
called a structure map (for G). If A is a subset of L(G) then by h(A) is meant 
{h(a) l a  E A}.  And if cr is a sequence, say cr = < a,�,y> , then by h(a) is meant 
< h(a) ,h(J3) ,h(y) > . 
deC 2 Given G with cr, 't in L(G), we say that a is isomorphic to 't in G, written 
cr ""0 't, iff there is a structure map h such that h(a) = 't and h('t) = cr. 
So two expressions are isomorphic in G iff there is a structure preserving map 
mapping each to the other. We note that the relation isomorphic in G is an 
equivalence relation (anything is isomorphic to itself; if a is isomorphic to 't then 
't is isomorphic to cr; and if p is isomorphic to a and a is isomorphic to 't then p 
is isomorphic to 't). And our final definition 
deC 3 A subset P of L(G) is syntactically identuJable iff for all cr ,  
cr E P and cr "" G  't => 't E P 
So given two expressions with the same structure, P must say yes to both, 
or no to both, but it cannot distinguish them. If it could then it would be relying 
on properties other than their syntactic structure. (Replacing ' subset' by • relation • 
generalizes deC 3 to relations.) 
2.3 Structure: A Linguistic Generalization 
Our definitions above do not take the notion of structure as basic. What is 
basic is the notion preserves structure. We may think of the " structure" of an 
expression as those properties it must share with any expression it is isomorphic 
to. In a (useful) phrase: 
(12) Structure is what the Structure Preserving Functions Preserve 
1 27 
NB: ( 12) is not circular. We have already defined what the structure 
preserving functions are (relative to a grammar G). We may now ask, and the 
answer is enlightening, just what it is that these functions may or must preserve. 
i. Structure maps must preserve the hierarchical structure oj derivation trees. 
E.g. let h be a structure map for ENG. Its value at <john laughed,S > is given 
by the tree on the right in ( 13),  where <john laughed,S > is represented by the 
tree on the left -- a tree that represents the result of applying FI to the pair 
<john ,NPnom > , < laughed,PI > . The reader may show that this follows 
directly from the fact that h preserves Dom(F l) and commutes with it. 
S h S 
(13) � --------- > 
� 
(john,NPnom) (laughed,PI) h(john,NPnom) h(laughed,P 1) 
NPnom I and (john,NPnom) are notational variants). 
john 
Thus we represent the action of a structure map on a standard tree by keeping 
the hierarchical structure of the tree the same and applying the function to the 
lexical leaves. In short, structure maps preserve hierarchical structure. They 
may preserve much else besides. 
ii. Structure maps may preserve category. They provably do in ENG: if 
Cat(cr) = X then Cat(h(cr)) = X. So in Little English the category of an 
expression is part of its structure. It is part of what an expression must share with 
any expression it is isomorphic to. This fact does not follow from the definition 
of structure map. Not all categories must be preserved in Little Korean below. 
And current linguistic work suggests that preserving category is not a conceptually 
necessary part of structure. At least X '  notation in part is set up to capture 
structural similarities among expressions of different categories. 
DI. Structure maps may preserve particular expressions (e.g. "bound 
morphemes"). For example in ENG all structure maps map (and, CONI) to 
itself. So if (and,CONJ) ""ENG "C then "C = (and, CONI). We suggest: 
Thesis The "grammatical" morphemes of a language are just the expressions 
which are isomorphic only to themselves9• In a phrase, 
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Grammatical morphemes are the nxed points of syntactic isomorpbisms 
An object x is a fixed point of a function f iff f(x) = x. f is said to fix x. The 
thesis says then that the grammatical morphemes of a language are those that an 
arbitrary expression must share with any expression it is isomorphic to. This is 
a non-trivial characterization of grammatical morpheme. 
Note then that in L(ENG) , (both laughed and cried,Pl) does not have the same 
structure as (either laughed or cried,PI), even though their derivation trees are 
isomorphic qua trees, differing just on the lexical items. Reason: on the G we 
gave, identity of coordinating conjunction is a part of structure -- something that 
must be preserved by the structure preserving maps. We thus issue: 
Warnings to Tree. Lovers 
1 .  Non-isomorphic expressions may have isomorphic trees 
2. A fixed (unambiguous) expression may have non-isomorphic trees 
3. Expressions generated in a fixed way may be isomorphic in 
one grammar and not isomorphic in another 
(Only the first warning has been instantiated here.) 
The Linguistic Generalization: Since structure is what the structure maps 
preserve, and morphemes and categories may be preserved, these notions may be 
just as ··structural " as syntactic hierarchy in a given language. Thus we need not 
think of Korean case marking as simply coding hierarchy relations. It may be 
structural on its own -- that is, preserved under syntactic isomorphisms. 
Finally, let us consider some sets of expressions (and relations between 
expressions) which are (or are not) syntactically identifiable in ENG. We note 
first some sets that are syntactically identifiable in all G (see Keenan and Stabler, 
1991)  for many more examples and more extensive discussion): 
Theorem 1: Universally Identifiable Sets 
Given a grammar G ,  
1.  L(G) and 0 are syntactiCally identifiable 
So if cr is isomorphic to 't and cr is in L(G) then 't must also be in L(G). 
Thus grammatical expressions are not isomorphic to ungrammatical ones. 
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2. a. If A and B are identifiable so is A -- B, the set of things in A not in B 
b. The union (intersection) of arbitrarily many syntactically identifiable sets 
is itself syntactically identifiable 
(2a.b) guarantee that we can define new identifiable sets from old ones using 
and, or and not, and universal and existential quantification. 
3. For 0- E L(G) and [a] the set of things isomorphic to a, [0-] is syntactically 
identifiable, and no non-empty proper subset of [0-] is identifiable 
4. The occurs in relation is syntactically identifiable 
[J 
Given a grammar G and a category C, write PHo(C) for the set of expressions 
in L(G) of category C. A a E PHo(C) is cailed a phrase of category C (in G). 
Theorem 2: Syntactically identifiable sets in ENG 1 
1. For all categories C of ENG, PHENG(C) is syntactically identifiable 
Thus any two isomorphic expressions in L(ENG) have the same category. 
Also PHENG(NPnom) -- PHENo(NPacc) , the set of NPnoms that are not also 
NPaccs is syntactically identifiable (using Theorem 1.2a here) . 
2. The set ?ANA of expressions of category NPacc which contain an 
occurrence of himself is not syntactically identifiable in ENG. 
o 
Note: ?ANA is a reasonable first guess at a "syntactic" defmition of the A­
expressions of L(ENG). But it turns out that this set is not syntactically definable 
in terms of the grammar ENG. Reason: ENG does not allow us to distinguish 
himse/ffrom him. In this grammar that is like trying to distinguish john from bill. 
No grammatical process treats them differently. 
More formally, ?ANA is not syntactically identifiable because there is a 
structure map h which interchanges (himself,NPacc) and (him,NPacc) . (h fixes 
the other lexical items and extends as a " string homomorphism" to the complex 
expressions). But ?ANA is not closed under h. E.g. (himseJ.t:NPacc) E ?ANA 
but h(himself,NPacc) = (him,NPacc) � ?ANA. 
Thus we have pairs of expressions with the same syntactic form one of which 
is in ?ANA and the other of which is not. So membership in ?ANA cannot be 
predicted from the syntactic form of the expression. 
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2.4 A Semantic Definition of A·expression 
Given a domain 0 of (possibly abstract) objects about which we think of 
ourselves as speaking on some occasion , we shall think of PI ' s as (minimallyl� 
interpreted as subsets of D. Call such subsets (extensional) propenies. P2 ' s  will 
be interpreted as binary relations over 0, that is, as sets whose elements are 
ordered pairs of elements of D. Boolean compounds of Pn I S are interpreted as the 
corresponding set theoretic operations of the denotations of the expressions 
compounded. E.g. noting interpretations in bold, the interpretation of (laughed 
and praised bill, PI) is laugh (") praise bill. That is, an object in D has the 
property expressed by laughed and praised bill iff that object lies in the 
interpretation of (laugh,PI) and also in the interpretation of (praised bill,PI). 
Proper nouns and (him ,NPacc) will denote ( = be interpreted as) individuals, 
functions (defined below) which map properties into {true,false} and binary 
relation to properties (and more generally n + I ary relations to n·ary relations) . 
def 4 For each d e D, we define Id by: 
i. Id(P) = true iff d e p 
ii . Id(R) = {a e 0 1  < a,d > e R} 
[all subsets p of D] and 
[all binary relation R over D] 
Id is called the individual generated by d. 
Suppose for examplejohn E D and both (john,NPacc) and (john,NPnom) are 
interpreted as the individual generated by john. Then (john laughed, S) will be 
interpreted as true iff john e laugh, and (critidzedjohn, PI) will be interpreted 
as the set of objects a E D such that < ajohn > E criticize. That is, (criticized 
john, PI) denotes the set of objects which stand in the criticize relation to john. 
Crucially now (himself,NPacc) is interpreted by the function self below, whose 
domain is just the set of binary relations over D: 
def 5 self(R) = {a e D I < a,a, > e R} 
One computes then that (john criticized himself,S) is interpreted as true iff 
<johnJohn> e criticize. 
Boolean compounds of NPs are interpreted pointwise. E.g. (criticized both 
john and himself, PI) denotes the intersection of the denotation of (criticizedjohn, 
PI) with that of (criticized himself, PI) :  IjohD(criticize) (") self(criticize) . So an 
object a is in this set iff < aJohn > e criticize and < a,a > e criticize. 
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Now, to semantically define A-expressions, we want to find a semantic 
property which distinguishes for example (both john and himself, NPacc) from 
(both john and bill, NPacc) . Keenan (1987) provides just such a property (one 
that is independent of which object NPs the language possesses) . An object NP 
denotation is a function mapping binary relations to properties. If the NP is not 
anaphoric then its function f puts an object b in the set it associates with a relation 
R just by checking bR, the set of things that b bears R to . It does not depend on 
what object b is. That is, f could not make a different decison concerning some 
other object b I that bore R to the same things b did . By contrast an anaphoric 
function can use the identity of b in making its decision. 
For example, suppose that the people John praised are exactly those which 
Bob criticized. Then (14a.b) must have the same truth value, so most of Jim 's 
students is not anaphoric. But (l5a,b) may have different truth values: if John 
praised just Mary, Bob , Susan, and Sam. Then (l5a) is false but (I5b) true. 
(14) a .  John praised most of Jim ' s  students 
b.  Bob criticized most of Jim I s students 
(15) a. John praised both Sam and himself 
b. Bob criticized both Sam and himself 
So we define: 
def 6 An expression interpreted as a function mapping binary relations to 
properties is an A -expression iff in every situation its denotation f satisfies [A] and 
in some situations it fails [B] . 
[A] aR = as :::::> a E f(R) iff a E f(S) 
[B] aR ::::: bS ::::> a E f(R) iff b E f(S) 
Using this properly semantic definition of A-expression we may observe: 
Theorem 3 
1 .  (himself,NPacc) is the only lexical A-expression in L(ENG) 
2. The set of A-expressions of L(ENG) is infinite 
3. The set of A-expressions of L(ENG) is not syntactically identifiable 
3.3 follows directly from 3.1 plus (himself,NPacc) "'ENG (himNPacc). Also, we 
intended that ENG satisfy usual C-command conditions on the distribution of 
anaphors so that we could properly contrast it with Little Korean. However bill 
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asymmetrically C-commands himself in ( 16) but is not interpretable as its 
antecedent (nor can it be in real English) .  
( 16) (john praised either bill or both tom and himself, S) 
Finally we observe that the AA (Anaphor-Antecedent) relation, defined below, 
is syntactically identifiable (a fact that does not, as we have seen with ? ANA, 
follow from its apparent syntactic form) 
(17) a is a structurally possible antecedent 0/ 13 in 'Y iff 31t e PHENO(P2), 
F I (a,F2(13 ' ,tt» occurs in y 
2.S Little Korean 
We exhibit a grammar, KOR, which illustrates how case marking may be 
directly structural and how A-expressions may asymmetrically C-command their 
antecedents, but in which, as in L(ENG) , the AA relation is syntactically 
identifiable. In fact in L(KOR) the (infinite) set of A-expressions is syntactically 
identifiable. The essence of our grammar is summarized in the two derivation 
trees below, plus several comments on them. We state the grammar informally, 
leaving details to the reader on the model for ENG. 
( 1 8) a S � 
KPn PIn 
1\ .� 
NP K KPa P2 '" 
NP K 
I , 
john -nom himself -ace praised 
b. S � 
KPa Pla 
/\ A NP K KPn P2 
I NPA K 
If . 
, , . sed himse -aee John -nom pral
There are only two strings of category K "Casemarker" ,  -nom and -ace, both 
lexical , and there are only four strings of category NP, john, bill, pron, and 
himself, again all lexical . A generating function CASEMARK combines all NP 
strings with -acc to form KPa's, accusative Cose Phrases, and it combines all NP 
strings except himself with -nom to form KPn' s, nominative Case Phrases. So 
himself-nom is not a string of any category in L(KOR) and (cf real Korean) john 
and himself in e.g. ( 1Sb) cannot be interchanged preserving grammaticality. 
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F2 combines KPa's and P2s to make PIn 's. It also combines KPn ' s  and P2s 
to make PIa's.  FI combines PIn 's  with KPn' s  to make S i S. It also combines 
PIa 's  with KPa's  to make Ss. So KPs and Ph agree when they combine to 
make Ss. There are two lexical P2 ' s  as in ENG, two lexical PIn ' s  (laughed, 
cried) and no lexical PIa's. The coordinable categories are P2 , PIa, PIn, S ,  
KPa, and KPn. Note the following structural facts re L(KOR): 
Structural Facts re Little Korean 
1. The categories K, NP. CONJ, and S are preserved by all structure maps. 
So e.g. structure preserving maps send casemarkers only to casemarkers. 
2. No structure map sends anything other than (himself,NP) to (himself,NP). 
Thus (himself,NP) is isomorphic only to itself, and so is a grammatical 
word in L(KOR) 
3. For all structure maps h, h(-nom,K) � h(-acc,K) .  So we may not collapse 
casemarkers preserving structure. But a structure map may interchange 
(-nom,K) and (-acc,K) thus interchanging KPn' s  and KPa's, and PIn' s 
and PIa's, provided it maps nothing to (himself,NP). 
4. a. (18a) and ( 18b) are not isomorphic 
b. (john-nom bill-ace praised, S) and (bill-nom john-ace praised, S) 
are isomorphic 
Fact 4 is subtle, but is provable from our definitions. An isomorphism h 
between ( 18a) and (18b) would map (john-nom,KPn) to (himseif-ace,KPa), 
interchange (-nom,K) and (-acc,K), and map (john,NP) to (himself,NP). But 
< (-ace,K) , (john,NP» e Dom(CASEMARK) and its image < (-nom,K) , 
(himself,NP) > under h is not, so h fails to preserve the domains of all the 
generating functions and so is not a structure map, contradicting the assumption. 
In the semantics for L(KOR) , the casemarkers (actually just (-nom,K), n - I 
casemarkers suffice to distinguish n KPs) are interpreted in an essential way. It 
turns out that (1 8a,b) are logically equivalent in L(KOR) , notwithstanding that the 
A-expression and its antecedent reverse their asymmetric C-command relations. 
The core of the semantics is this: proper nouns and pron are interpreted as 
individuals, and (himselJ,NP) is interpreted as self, as in ENG. (-aee,K) denotes 
the identity function, so KPa's behave like NPs in L(ENG). In particular they 
map binary relations, P2 denotations, to properties, possible PIn denotations. 
What is new is the interpretation of (-nom,K),  KPn 's, and PIa's . 
134 
These new denotations are all determined by the interpretation nom of the 
bound morpheme (-nom ,K) . Let us write [R -» P] for the set of functions from 
the set of binary relations over the domain D into the set of properties over D.  
Then nom, by definition, takes individuals (its only possible arguments) to 
functions which (1) take properties to truth values, as in ENG, and (2) take binary 
relations to functions mapping [R � P] into {true, false} ,  as follows: 
nom(IJ(R)(G) = Id(G(R» 
So for example, the interpretation of (himself-ace john-nom praised, S) is 
« nom(ljobJ)(praise»(self) = IjobD(self(praise» which is just the interpretation of 
(john-nom himself-ace praised,S). Thus the fact that (I Sa) and (ISb) are logical 
paraphrases is due entirely to the interpretation of the bound morphology in Little 
Korean, one of the obvious areas where languages admit of language particular 
material. And we observe: 
Theorem 4 
1 .  The set of A-expressions in L(KOR) is syntactically definable. (Note that 
A-expressions in Little Korean are KPa's) 
2. The relation SPAKoR, is a structurally possible antecedent 0/, defined below 
is also syntactically identifiable 
def 7 < a.,�,y > E SPAKoR iff Cl E PHKoR[KPn] & 30 FI(Cl,F2(�,0» occurs in 
y or F I (�,F2(Cl,0» occurs in y. 
Thus in Ls in which case marking is part of structure, it is possible to 
"scramble" A-expressions and their antecedents reversing C-command relations, 
without losing the ability to structurally identify the Anaphor-Antecedent relation 
(or even the set of A-expressions itself). 
3. Condition F (or Patience Rewarded) 
(Thanks separately to Dorit Ben-Shalom, Dusko Pavlovic and Ed Stabler for 
discussion of the points below) . 
Little Korean is probably as close as we get to a language that can interchange 
A-expressions and their antecedents freely without violating Anaphor·Antecedent 
Asymmetry (AAA) . Ultimately satisfying AAA is due to the fact that himself­
nom is not a string of category KPn. If we weakened the grammar to allow it 
(" Irish Korean") then we would generate as Ss strings like himself-nom cried and 
himself-nom cried and criticized bill. These Ss would force himself-nom to 
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receive a non-anaphoric interpretation, so (18a,b) would not'be logical paraphrases 
and AAA would still be satisfied . 
But now that we are clear as to what counts as a syntactic isomorphism let us 
see what a "language" would look like that really did violate the AAA. The 
attempt will lead us to understand a condition on interpretation which runs 
sufficiently deep that, to my knowledge, it has never been articulated as a 
constraint on natural languages. This is, of course, the Fidelity condition F. 
Part of F is familiar from stand3Id considerations of compositionality: the 
interpretation of derived expressions should depend on the interpretation of those 
they are derived from (up to listable exceptions, e.g. idioms). This is, I think, 
conceptually necessary. If e.g. You 're standing on my foot! could freely mean 
Most unicorns like cabbage or else none do then language would have no value 
as a system of representation (and derivatively of communication) and so could 
not be used to satisfy the conceptual-intentional functions we do in fact use it for. 
But F will say more than this, and the more echos curiously claims in CH-92 
concerning the constancy across "languages" of the computational procedure used 
in deriving expressions from the lexicon. The lexicon and morphology of 
languages do vary, but one expects the ways of building complex expressions from 
simpler ones to vary rather less, precisely because of their generality. 
Here is a semantic analogue of these syntactic claims: Lexical items may differ 
semantically even when they are syntactically indistinguishable (John/Bill, 
probably laugh/cry, etc.). And as a consequence complex expressions which 3Ie 
syntactically isomorphic may be interpreted differently. John laughed and Bill 
cried may differ in truth value even though they are built in the same way from 
syntactically isomorphic parts. 
But, I claim, the procedures we use, for interpreting isomorphic expressions 
cannot be "radically" different. They must, in effect, be "isomorphic" .  But just 
what exactly does this mean? An example leads to the answer, F. 
Imagine a function g which interprets lexical items of Little English as before 
but which interprets the Ss generated by Fl as in (19), where BOOL(john,bill) is 
the set of NPnoms buildable from {(john,NPnom) , (bill,NPnom)} with 
both . . . and . . .  , either . . .  or . . . ,and neither . . .  nor . . .  and - is boolean complement. 
{g(O')(g(t» if 0' � BOO
,
L(john,bill) 
(1 9) g(F I (O',t» = 
-(g(O')(g(t» otherwise' 
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So e.g. both john and tom laughed is true iff John laughed and Tom laughed . But 
bothjohn and bill laughed is true iff either John didn 't laugh or Bill didn' t  laugh.  
This is  outrageous. What we say on this "semantics" about John and Tom is not 
what we say about John and Bill in the isomorphic sentence. What is wrong here 
is that in deciding how to interpret an expression , g refers to a set 
BOOL(john,bill) which is not syntactically identifiable. (e.g. (john ,NPnom) is in 
it but (bob,NPnom) is not, even though these two NPs are isomorphic) . 
We now set up the general principle F whiCh will rule out perverse attempts 
at interpretation like g .  
Let L = L(G) be given. An interpretation of L i s  simply an arbitrary function 
IJ. with L included in its domain. So such a IJ. assigns values to the expressions 
of L. No assumptions are made concerning IJ.[L] ,  the set of values of IJ.. IJ.[L] 
might in particular be some appropriately coded form of "conceptual-intentional" 
structure. Here we shall neutrally refer to IJ.[L] simply as the "IJ. world " .  
Observe though that where h is a structure map for L the notation J.1(h) makes 
sense. We think here of h as the set of pairs < 5,h(5) > for each expression 5 
in L(G). Then IJ.(h) is just the set of pairs < IJ.(o) ,J.1(h(o» > .  And for F a 
generating function of L, we write IJ.(F) for the set of pairs < J.l(a) ,!J.(F(a» > ,  
where 0" is a sequence of elements of L(G) in the domain of F. 
Now not just any way of interpreting a language is a conceptually possible 
semantic interpretation . We require that semantic interpretations IJ. are faithful 
to the syntax of the language, as per (1) repeated as (20) below: 
(20) F 
Semantic interpretations of a language L are faithful to the syntax of L 
def 8 An interpretation IJ. of a language L(G) isfaithful to the syntax of L(G) iff 
IJ. satisfies 1 and 2: 
1.For all structure building functions F of G, J.1(F) is a (structure 
building) function in IJ.[L] 




The basic idea is that a semantic interpretation of a language not only interprets 
the expressions, it respects the structure of L - in particular it respects the 
relation between a complex expression and what it is derived from, and it respect 
the sameness of structure relation between different expressions built in the same 
ways. In more detail : 
1 .  F(l) says that if F builds 1: from a, F(a) = 't, then �(F) builds J.1('t) from 
J..l(a) , (J..lF)(J..la) = J.1(1:) . That is, the following diagram commutes (a fact that 
is guaranteed as long as �(F) as given above is a function): 
F 
0- F(a) 
� I I J.1 
j.L(0-) 1 --------------------------- > J.1(F(a» 
J..l(F) 
Note that F(l) is just standard compositionality: if an expression 't is derived 
as a function F of a tuple a of expressions then the interpretation J.1(t) of 1: is a 
function of the interpretation j.L(o) of a. That function of course may depend on 
how 1: was built from 0-, that is, on F.  
2. F(2) is  the condition that i s  properly new. It guarantees that expressions 
with the same syntactic structure have the same semantic structure. Specifically, 
the following diagram commutes: 
h 10 1 ------ ------ > h(o) 
� I � 
j.L(0) 1 ------------------ > j.L(h(o» 
J..l(h) 
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We might note that as long as /l(h) is a function then it preserves structure in 
the Il world: that is, it preserves the domains of the structure building functions 
tJ.(F) and i"t commutes with themll • 
3 .  Let us see that F(2) is independent of F(l). Let Il be a function whose 
domain is L(ENG) = Little English satisfying: 
/l(laughed,Pl)  = {tom ,bob ,bill} , /l(tom,NPnom) = tom, etc. and 
{ Il(cr)(/l(t» if cr e BOOL( <john,NPnom > , < bill,NPnom » 
Il(F 1 (cr,t» = 
-[/l(cr)(/l(t» ] otherwise 
So 1l(F 1) maps a pair < Ilcr, Il t > to 1l(F 1 ( < a, t > ) , as above. 1l(F2), 
Il(AND) , etc. are defined similarly. Thus F(l) is satisfied. 
Let h be a structure map which interchanges (tom,NPnom) and (bill,NPnom) 
and maps each other lexical expression to itself. (There is such an h) . Then, 
omitting category indices for simplicity , and writing 1 for true and 0 for false, 
suppose, leading to a contradiction, that /l is a function. Then, 
/l(h)(l) = tJ.(h)(Il(tom)(/l(laughed» ) = /l(h)(/l(tom laughed» 
But also, 
= tJ.(h(tom laughed» = Il(h(tom),h(laughed» = Il(bill laughed) 
= -[/l(bill)(/l(laughed)] = -(1) = o. 
/l(h)( l) = /l(h)(/l(bob)( /l(laughed» = /l(h)(/l(bob laughed» 
Il(h(bob laughed» = tJ.(h(bob) ,h( laughed» = /l(bob laughed) 
= Il(bob)(/l(laughed» = 1 
So /l(h)(l)  = 1 and /l(h)(l) = 0, contradiction. So F(2) fails. • 
4. Equally a simple language shows that F(2) does not entail F(l) , and thus 
the two conditions are independent12• 
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4. Condition F implies Anapbor-Antecedent Asymmetry 
We attempt to construct a language, L-SYM, in which AAA is violated . 
(2 1) L violates Anapbor Antecedent Asymmetry iff L presents isomorphic 
transitive Ss which are logically equivalent in which the anaphor in one is 
mapped by the isomorphism to the antecedent in the second, and vice versa. 
L-SYl\1 is given schematically below: 
PI:  laughed, cried P2: praised, criticized 
NPl : john, bill, he NP2. l :  john, bill, he NP2.2: john, bill, himself 
Fl : (s,NP l ) , (t,Pl ) = (s +t,S) 
F2 :  Dom(F2) = { < cr,-t,n > I cr2,t2 E {NP2. I ,  NP2.2} & cr2 :t: 't2 & 1C:z  = P2} 
Coordination rules as usual, just combine expressions of the same category. 
fact There is a (bijective) structure map h which maps all expressions of category 
NP2 . 1  to ones of category NP2.2 and vice versa. h interchanges (john,NP2. I) 
and (himse/f,NP2.2) and fixes all P2s. So (22a,b) are isomorphic in L-SYM. 
(22) a. Gohn himself praised,S) b. (himself john praised,S) 
Moreover the interpretations 1.1. we design make them logically equivalent. 
These 1.1. interpret lexical items, Ss built by FI ,  and boolean compounds as 
expected. Only the interpretation of expressions built by F2 is tricky. 
{ )J.(cr)(Il(t(ll(n» ) if (crl oNP2. I) E L(G) and 
1l(F2(a,'t,n» = 
ll(t)(J..L(cr(ll(n» ) otherwise 
Thus a 1.1. looks at an expression (x + y + praised,S), checks if x is a string 
of category NP2. l ,  in which case it interprets it as applying last. If x is not such 
a string then the interpretation of (y,NP2. 1) applies last and ll(x,NP2.2) maps the 
binary relation to a property. But these 1.1. then must be able to tell whether an 
expression is in PHsyM[NP2. l] ,  and this set is not syntactically identifiable (since 
e.g. (john,NP2 . 1 ) is in it but (himseif,NP2.2) is not) . So it should be the case, 
and is, that our 1..1. in general fail F(2) . 
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To see this,  let J.1. be a function with domain L8SYM, and let J.1. identify 
<john,NP2 . 1 >  and <john,NP2.2 > (and ditto for < bill , . . .  > .  (Actually this 
requirment is almost forced since J..l is required to be a function and so must assign 
just one value to e.g. <john bill praised,S > though this latter has two sources, 
one with <john, NP2. 1  > and the other with <john, NP2 .2 > .  Call this common 
interpretation john. Let h be the identify on LEX except for the stipulations given 
below in which h permutes the lexical elements of PHsYM[NP2. 1] and 
PHSYM[NP2.2] . 
Then : 
1 .  J..l(h)(john) 
h 
NP2. 1 -> NP2 .2 
jOhn�himself 
bill john 
he ( l) bill 
J..l(h)(J..l <john,NP2.2 » = J.1.(h( <john,NP2 .2 » 
J..l( <john,NP2. 1 » = john 
so <johnjohn > E J..l(h) and 
2. J.l(h)(john) J.1.(h)(J..l( <john , NP2. 1 > ) 
= J..l(hGohn,NP2. 1) = J.1.( < himself,NP2.2 » = self 
so <john,self > E J..l(h) , so J.l(h) is not a function, violating F(2). 0 
And in general if L does not syntactically distinguish anaphors and non­
anaphors then interpreting functions can not distinguish between them satisfying 
F(2). But interpreting functions must distinguish between them in order to know 
which to apply second in minimal transitive Ss. Thus an L which does not 
distinguish between anaphors and non-anaphors will not admit of a faithful 
interpreting function . 
Thus does Fidelity predict Anaphor Antecedent Asymmetry. 
141  
Footnotes 
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members of the McGill Mathematics and Statistics department to whom I 
presented this work. 
1 .  These would correspond to the LFs in the format of CH-92. 
2. Caveat: F makes a claim that should be assessed on its own merits, and not 
according to whether it captures anything intended in CH-92 (which I think it does 
not). But reading CH-92 after presenting this principle I could not help but be 
struck by the fact that F has many of the generality properties Chomsky associates 
with n (virtual) conceptual necessity" .  It falls just short, it seems, of logical 
necessity. Certainly the counterexample to F constructed in 3 is linguistically 
unnatural . If further work supports the truth of F but places it outside the 
"(virtual) conceptual necessities" countenanced within the Minimalist Framework, 
we shall at least have learned something about the nature of those necessities. 
3. While most work on anaphora in generative grammar is consistent with the 
claim that the set of A-expressions (and the anaphor-antecedent relation) are 
syntactically characterizable, that work generally lacks a semantic defmition of 
these notions and hence is conceptually unprepared to falsify these claims. Note 
that the items which (on our view) are defined as A-expressions are syntactic 
objects (expressions) , but they are defined as those expressions which satisfy some 
semantic condition. So it makes sense to ask if the grammar G provides the 
syntactic tools to yield a syntactic definition of the same set. The case is quite 
analogous to whether the set of logically true sentences in one or another 
mathematical language can be syntactically defined. (And the answer is that it 
depends on the language -- for some it can be, for others it cannot) . 
4. This usage is more widespread in England than is apparent from the literature. 
I have also found American English speakers of Irish descent whose home 
communities maintain this usage. 
5 .  For presentational purposes I have, reluctantly, followed the Anglo-centric bias 
implicit in the term ' scrambling ' which takes the word order freedom in Korean 
(Chinese, Bengali, Japanese, Malayalam) as a phenomenon which needs 
explaining. An alternative view is that their word order freedom is simply the 
consequence of not having applied FIX ORDER. There is no gain to fixing the 
order of arguments, as the independently present morphology provides the desired 
information . But applying FIX ORDER yields a benefit in morphologically 
impoverished languages, as their NPs are dumb: they cannot tell us what their 
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function is. So what we explain on this view is word order rigidity in English, 
not its freedom in Korean . 
6. It is worth noting however that the easy tests that discriminate e.g. John likes 
himself and Himself John likes in English do not carry over to Korean. The 
reflexive first order in English is largely limited to root clauses, does not feed 
extraction (*the man that himself likes. *Who does himself like ?) and does not 
admit of a free choice of antecedent (*?Himselfnoone likes). But in Korean (and 
Bengali) reflexive first order occurs easily in subordinate clauses, (i). 
i. a. Mary-ka caki-casin-ul hoyhap-eyse pinanhayssta 
Mary-nom self- -acc meeting-at criticized 
Mary criticized herself at the meeting 
b. caki-casin-ul Mary-ka pinanhayssten hoyhap 
self- -acc Mary-nom criticized meeting 
the meeting at which Mary criticized herself 
Also the major way of focussing on an "object" is not to "front" it, but rather 
to mark it with a "Topic" postposition, in the preverbal position, (ii). 
ii. Linda-ka Mary-nun pinanhayssta 
Linda-nom Mary-top criticized 
Linda criticized MARY (as opposed to someone else) 
So again in Korean morphology is used where word order and presumably 
hierarchy variation are used in English. 
7. Formally, L(G) =df n{B � V·xCAT I LEX � B & B is closed wrt each F E F} 
8 .  More precisely, let {Kj}iE I be an indexed family of sets. Set GI = < UjK;, I, 
{ < s,i > I s  E K;} ,0 > .  Then L(Gt> = LEX and for each category i E I ,  the set 
of strings of category i is exactly K;. 
9. The Thesis gets a basic idea right here, but it  needs be generalized . One 
approach is elaborated in Stabler & Keenan (1993). 
10. A richer semantics is ultimately needed for natural language, but the 
minimalist extensional representation here is sufficient to capture core facts 
regarding binding and quantifier scope. 
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1 1 . proof: 
1 .  J..l(h) preserves Dom(J..l(F» : Let J.l(o) E Dom(J..l(F» , so 0 E Dom(F). But 
then h(o) E Dom(F) since h is a structure map and so preserves Dom(F). But 
then J..l(h).(J..l(O» = J..l(h(o» E Dom(J..l(F» . 
2. J..l(h) commutes with 1l(F): 
J..l(h) (J..l (F) (J..lo) ) = 1l(h)(J..l(Fo» , def J..l(F) 
= J..l(h(Fo» def J..l(h) 
= J..l(F(h(O» )  h commutes with F 
= J..l(F) (J..l (h(o» def 1l(F) 
= (IlF)(Il(h)(J..ld» def Il(h) 
0 
12 .  Observe first that given any grammar G, a structure map h is the identity 
function on L(G) iff for all 0 E LEX, h(o) = O. (Proof by recursion: h maps 
each 0 in LEX to itselfJ and if h maps a tuple cr in Dom(F) to itself then h maps 
F(cr) to itself since h(F(cr» := F(h(O'» := F(O'» . 
Now we construct a simple G in which the only structure map is id, the 
identity function. Since id = { < o,o > 1 0  E L(G)} then for any map J..l whose 
domain includes L(G) , J..l(id) ::: { <  J..l0,J,LO > 1 0  E L(G)} is a function. That is, 
any map from L will send each structure map to a (structure preserving) function. 
Let G have three generating functions: F, H, and K, with domains: 
Dom(F) 
<john,NP > 
< bill,NP > 
Dom(H) 
< bill,NP > 




Where <p is any of these functions and 0 any element of its domain, <1>(0) =4f 
< 01 + laughed, S > . 
Let J..l be given as follows: Il maps all NPs to a fixed object a, and all other 
expressions 0' to String(cr). So 1l(F) contains < J..l(john,NP), J..l(F(john. NP) > = 
< a ,john laughed > and also < J..l(bill,NP), J..l(F(bill,NP» > = < a,bill laughed> . 
So J..l(F) is not a function. a 
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